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This  paper  presents  three  baseline 
scenarios  of  no  policy  action  computed 
by  the  IMAGE  2  model.  These  scenarios 
cover  a  wide  range  of  coupled  global 
change  indicators,  including:  energy 
demand  and  consumption;  food  demand, 
consumption,  and  production;  changes  in 
land  cover  including  changes  in extent  of 
agricultural  land  and  forest;  emissions  of 
greenhouse  gases  and ozone  precursors; 
and  climate  change  and  its  impacts  on 
sea  level  rise,  crop  productivity  and 
natural  vegetation.  Scenario  information 
is  available  for  the  entire  world  with 
regional  and grid  scale  detail,  and covers 
from  1970 to 2100.  The  scenarios  indicate 
that  the  coming  decades  could  be  a 
period  of  relatively  rapid  global 
environmental  change  as  compared  to 
the  period  before  and  afler.  The  natural 
vegetation  in industrialized  regions  could 
be  threatened  by  climate  change,  but 
abandonment  of  agricultural  lands  could 
also  make  new  lands  available  for 
refore5taGon  and  revegetation.  The 
opposite  is  true  for  most  of  Asia  and 
Africa.  Here  the  impacts  of  climate 
change  on  vegetation  may  not  be  as 
significant  as  in  temperate  climates,  but 
the  demand  for  food  will  lead  to  a 
significant  expansion  of agricultural  lands 
at  the  expense  of  remaining  forests  and 
other  natural  areas.  Copyright  ((1  1996 
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It  is  impossible  to  evaluate  policies  to  protect  the  global  climate  and 
environment  without  a  benchmark  of  ‘no  action’.  Such  a  benchmark  is 
needed  to  evaluate  the  consequences  of  not  acting,  and  to  assess  the 
added  value  of  adopting  policies  to  protect  the  global  environment.  The 
main  objective  of  this  paper  is to  present  a set of  baseline  scenarios  that 
illustrate  these  benchmark  conditions  of  global  environmental  change. 
We  call  them  ‘integrated’  scenarios  because  they  give  an  integrated 
picture  of  global  developments  spanning  a wide  range  of  global  change 
indicators,  each  of  which  are  explicitly  coupled.  The  scenarios  include 
information  about  society  related  driving  forces  such  as  energy  and 
food  consumption,  as  well  as  emissions  of  major  global  air  pollutants, 
and changes  in the state  of the global  atmospheric,  terrestrial  and  oceanic 
environments.  Of course,  the  scenarios  are  far  from  being  a comprehen- 
sive  description  of  the  global  environment,  but  their  wide  scope  and 
geographic  description  of  the  global  environmental  change  is unique  in 
the  scientific  literature.  They  have  sufficient  detail  for  use  as  reference 
scenarios  in  a  wide  range  of  policy  and  scientific  evaluations,  and  are 
used  for  this purpose  in other  papers  in this issue.’ 
Because of the great uncertainty  of establishing  future  baseline conditions, 
we present  three  alternative  scenarios.  Each  scenario  examines  the  conse- 
quences  on global  environmental  change  of a different  set of ‘not implausi- 
ble’ developments  of population,  economy,  and other  driving  forces: 
0  Baseline  A  is an  intermediate  scenario  with  medium  assumptions 
about  population  growth,  economic  growth,  and  economic  activity; 
0  Baseline  B has  lower  estimates  of all driving  forces  compared  to  A; 
l  Baseline  C has  the  same  estimate  for  population  growth  as A, but 
higher  estimates  of economic  growth,  and  economic  activity. 
Later,  the assumptions  of these  scenarios  are examined  in detail. 
A  major  challenge  in  developing  scenarios  of  global  environmental 
change  is how  to  maintain  their  consistency.  This  is partly  solved  in this 
paper  by  using  an  integrated  model  of  the  global  environment,  IMAGE 
2, for  generating  these  scenarios.  The  model  is a tool  for  accomplishing 
a  measure  of  harmony  between  the  many  disparate  components  of  the 
scenarios.  The  goal  of  IMAGE  2  is  to  provide  a  disciplinary  and 
geographic  overview  of  global  environmental  changes.  The  model  is 
described  in Alcamo,’  and  a brief  overview  is given  below. 
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Figure  1.  World  regions  in  IMAGE  2 
model.  A  list  of  countries  assigned  to 
each  region  is  presented  in 
Appendix  1  of  Alcamo  et  al,  op  tit, 
Ref  26. 
Method and assumptions for computing scenarios 
The  IMAGE  2 model 
Assumptions  about  population,  economy,  and  economic  activity  are  the 
driving  forces  of  scenarios  in  this  paper.  Based  on  these  assumptions, 
IMAGE  2 computes  future  changes  in the  consumption  of energy,  food, 
and  timber.  This  consumption  leads  to  emissions  to  the  atmosphere 
from  fuel  combustion  and  industrial  production,  shifts  in  land  use  and 
land  cover,  and  changes  in the  fluxes  of  gases from  the  terrestrial  envir- 
onment.  The  emissions  and  fluxes  of  gases  lead  to  changes  in the  atmo- 
spheric  composition  of  various  gases,  as  well  as  changes  in  the  flux  of 
heat  and  moisture  between  the terrestrial,  oceanic  and  atmospheric  envir- 
onments.  Eventually  these  fluxes  affect  regional  climate,  and  these 
changes  in regional  climate  then  feedback  to  the  terrestrial  and  oceanic 
environments  in different  ways,  for  example,  by changing  the  productiv- 
ity  of crops  and  consequently  the  required  amount  of future  agricultural 
land. 
The  IMAGE  2 model  consists  of  13 individual  global  submodels  orga- 
nized  into  three  fully  linked  subsystems:  Energy-Industry,  Terrestrial 
Environment,  and  Atmosphere-Ocean  (Figure  1). The  Energy-Zndustry 
models  compute  the  emissions  of  greenhouse  and  other  gases  from  five 
sectors  in  13 world  regions  (Figure  2) based  on  estimates  of  industrial 
production  and  energy  consumption.  The  Terrestrial  Environment 
models  simulate  changes  in  global  land  use  and  cover  on  a  grid  scale 
taking  into  account  shifts  in  the  demand  and  potential  productivity  of 
land.  These  models  also compute  the  subsequent  fluxes  of gases between 
the  terrestrial  environment  and  atmosphere.  The  Atmosphere-Ocean 
models  calculate  the  changes  in atmospheric  composition  of  greenhouse 
and  other  gases,  changes  in the  heat  and  moisture  balance  of  the  earth, 
and  subsequent  shifts  in  temperature  and  precipitation  patterns.  Each 
submodel  has  been  tested  either  with  data  from  1970 to  1990, or  long- 
term  averages,  depending  on suitability  and  availability  of data.  An over- 
World  regions  in IMAGE  2 
1  Canada 
2  USA 
3  Latin  America 
4  Africa 
5  OECO  Europe 
6  Eastern  Europe  10  China  + C.P.  countries 
7  CIS  11  East  Asia 
6  Middle East  12  Oceania 
9  India + SAsia  13  Japan 
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Figure  2.  Schematic  diagram  of 
IMAGE  2  model. 
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view of model  development  and  testing  is given in Alcamo  et af.3 Details 
of  development  and  testing  of  the  Energy-Industry  subsystem  are  given 
in  de  Vries  et  at4  for  the  Terrestrial  Environment  subsystem  in  Klein 
Goldewijk  et  ~1,~ Kreileman  and  Bouwman6  Leemans  and  van  den 
Born,’  and  Zuidema  et  a1,8 and  for  the  Atmosphere-Ocean  subsystem 
in de Haan  et UP and  Krol  and  van  der  Woerd.” 
In the course  of the  paper  we discuss  critical  points  of  the calculations 
used  to  generate  the  scenarios  in this paper. 
Primary  driving  forces  and  assumptions 
As noted  above,  the main  driving  forces  of global  change  in these scenar- 
ios  are  population  and  economic  growth,  and  activity  in  economic 
sectors.  Here  we  discuss  demographic  and  economic  assumptions,  and 
in  the  section  on  energy  consumption  we  discuss  assumptions  about 
economic  activity. 
Population  growth.  The  intermediate  and  high  baseline  scenarios  in  this 
paper  (Baseline  A  and  C)  use  IPCc’s  medium  population  estimates 
(Table  l), and  these estimates  are close to medium  population  estimates  of 
Table  1.  Assumptions for population (mlllons) 
ReQion  1970  1990 
Canada  21.3  26.6 
USA  205.1  249.9 
Latin America  283.8  445.0 
Africa  359.8  693.3 
OECD  Europe  351.1  377.1 
Eastern Europe  108.4  123.4 
CIS  242.8  289.4 
Middle  East  114.9  202.1 
India  +  S Asia  739.4  1170.9 
ChIna  +  C P Asia  896.9  1242.1 
East Asia  239.5  368.0 
Oceania  16.2  21.4 
Japan  104.3  123.5 
World  3685.7  5297.5 
BaealirbeAandC  Basehe  B 
2010  2OQO  2100  2010  2oso  2100 
30.2  31.8  31 5  27.2  22.8  15.4 
283.0  298.2  295.2  263.6  234.9  166.0 
603.2  819.6  872.0  587.7  770.9  772.9 
1117.8  2198.3  2862.1  1022.2  1621.1  1611.4 
398.2  394.4  307.5  385.0  323.0  218.4 
135.5  149.3  147.8  132.5  128.9  97.2 
317.7  350.0  346.6  310.8  302.2  277.6 
364.3  762.2  931.7  325.0  439.4  345.3 
1635.1  2374.5  2643.5  1549.0  1896.9  1478.6 
1553.5  1806.3  1953.3  1460.6  1390.0  949.7 
513.9  746.2  830.8  486.8  596.1  464.7 
23.0  22.8  22.5  22.2  17.4  11.9 
132.7  131.5  129.9  128.1  100.7  68.9 
7108.0  10129.1  11455.2  6700.7  7844.3  6427.7 
Source:  Leggett et  al.  1992. 
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the United  Nations’  ’ and  of the International  Institute  of Applied  Systems 
Analysis  (IIASA).12 Hence  there  is some  international  agreement  on  these 
intermediate  projections.  The  low  baseline  scenario  (Baseline  B)  uses 
IPCC’s low population  estimate  which is lower than  that  used for any CO2 
emission  scenario  found  in the  literature,13  and  somewhat  below  the  low 
IIASA  estimate.  Summing  up,  there  is more  international  support  for  the 
medium  population  estimates  than  for the low estimates. 
Economic  growth.  The  baseline  scenarios  in this paper  use Gross  Domes- 
tic  Product  (GDP)  assumptions  of  IPCC  (Table  2).  These,  in  turn,  are 
partly  based  on  earlier  IPCC  work  and  partly  on  short-term  estimates 
of the World  Bank.14 
Medium  estimates  from  IPCC  are  used  in  this  paper  for  Baseline  A, 
and  are  lower  than  historical  trends  for  most  regions.  Nevertheless  these 
assumptions  imply  a substantial  increase  in GDP  per  capita.  For  exam- 
ple,  GDP  per  capita  in Latin  America  and  East  Asia  will exceed  current 
levels  in OECD  Europe  in constant  dollars.”  Nevertheless,  a  large  gap 
will  remain  in  income  between  industrialized  and  developing  regions. 
The  low and  high  estimates  used  in Baselines  B and  C are  also  based  on 
the  IPCC  and  are  representative  of  the  low and  high  range  of  estimates 
used  by other  researchers  to estimate  global  CO2 emissions.‘6 
Box  1. Main factors affecting energy consumption 
Factors specified for scenario: 
Activity  in each  economic  sector 
Structural  change  of economy 
Technological  change  leading  to  improvements  in  energy 
efficiency 
Factors computed internally by IMAGE 2 
Fuel  prices 
Computing  energy  consumption 
The  following  considerations  steered  the  development  of  the  baseline 
energy  scenarios.  First,  the  intermediate  scenario  (Baseline  A)  was 
intended  to  reflect  the  IPCC  medium  estimate  of  global  CO2 emission 
trends.”  Its  compatibility  with  the  IPCC  medium  estimate  enhances  its 
usefulness  internationally  as a reference  point  for evaluating  climate  poli- 
lsbk  2.  Assumptions for  Gross  Domeslk  Product (USI  per capita  PW  year) 
Baseline  A  Bssellne B  Basellne C 
Region  1970  1990  2010  2050  2100  2010  2050  2100  2010  2050  2100 
Canada  13001  21273  33599  65523  115454  29752  46102  64615  37993  69622  201262 
USA  15931  21866  38224  65531  114178  33884  48209  66522  43189  89709  199289 
Latin  America  2024  2569  3430  8425  25048  2840  5198  10762  4190  13626  59578 
Africa  813  646  700  1956  6553  596  1205  2803  835  3087  14843 
OECDEurope  12268  19065  30111  58722  103470  26664  41317  58088  34050  80320  180372 
Eastern Europe  1213  1913  4194  9584  16768  3970  6047  7278  6054  15638  39408 
CIS  1452  2476  3355  7666  13413  3136  4777  5749  4854  12540  31599 
Middle  East  2883  2823  3434  7018  19773  2912  4166  7893  4077  11306  46077 
India  + S Asia  220  327  563  1907  7436  480  1185  3240  683  3056  17103 
China  + C P Asia  127  369  807  3481  15226  675  2117  6552  977  5541  35352 
East  Asia  569  1508  2597  8795  34293  2215  5465  14941  3151  14093  78871 
Oceania  11670  15579  29600  58690  103093  26448  42862  59305  33684  82188  184012 
Japan  12088  23734  45399  89411  157058  40293  65299  90349  51317  125210  280335 
World  3073  3971  5595  9473  21319  4968  6566  10453  6481  13894  44485 
Source: Leggett eta/ 1992 
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ties.  Second,  the low and  high scenario  (Baseline  B and  C) were intended 
to  give  an  independent  view  about  the  uncertainty  around  the  medium 
estimate;  therefore  they  use  the driving  forces  of the  low and  high  IPCC 
scenarios,  but  are  not  calibrated  to  obtain  similar  emission  results. 
Third,  since  IMAGE  2 is fairly  unique  in its ability  to  perform  regional 
energy  and  emission  calculations,  the  baseline  scenarios  were  intended 
to  provide  new  information  about  regional  energy  use  and  emissions 
that  are consistent  with  the  ‘best’ global  emission  estimates. 
(1)  changes  in  the  level  of  activity  in each  economic  sector  connected 
with  changes  in income  and  population; 
(2)  ‘structural  changes’  of  the  economy  that  lead  to  changes  in energy 
intensity  of sectors; 
(3)  ‘technological  changes’  that  improved  the  performance  of  devices 
and  appliances  used  to deliver  energy  services; 
(4)  changes  in fief  prices  that  stimulate  energy  conservation  and  shifts 
in fuel mix. 
To  calculate  a  scenario  of  energy  consumption  for  each  of  13 world 
regions,  IMAGE  2 takes  into  account  four  main  factors  (Box  1): 
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7992.  The  Supplementary  Report  to  the 
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University  Press,  Cambridge,  1992,  pp 
71-95 
“‘Other’  stands  for  ‘other  energy  use’, 
and  this  includes  all  energy  use  not 
included  by  the  other  sectors.  The  activity 
indicator  for  this  sector  is GDP 
Economic  activity.  Historical  data  show  that  along  with  the  growth  of 
population  and  income  comes  an increase  in the  level of economic  activ- 
ity  (eg the  output  of  industry  and  the  number  of  vehicles).  The  baseline 
scenarios  assume  that  this  trend  will  continue  into  the  future.  Behind 
this is the conventional  economic  thinking  that  as citizens  become  ‘weal- 
thier’  (where  wealth  is poorly  defined  in  units  of  GDP  per  capita)  they 
purchase  and  possess  more  things.  Based  on  these  relationships  and  the 
scenarios  of  GDP  per  capita  for  each  region  noted  above,  we estimate 
activity  in each  sector  and  region  for  each  baseline.  This,  of  course,  is 
only  one  view  of  the  future,  and  not  necessarily  the  most  desirable  one 
especially  considering  the  impact  of  economic  growth  on  the  natural 
environment.  Nevertheless,  it  is appropriate  for  a  baseline  scenario  to 
reflect  conventional  economic  thinking. 
To  estimate  the  future  level  of economic  activity  we first  compute  the 
relationship  between  GDP  per  capita  and  activity  indicators  in  each  of 
five  sectors  (Industry,  Transport,  Residential,  Services,  and  ‘Other’)‘* 
and  in each  region  for  the  period  1970 to  1990. This  relationship  is then 
used  with  the  baseline  scenarios  of  GDP  (Table  2)  to  estimate  future 
activity  levels (Table  3). 
Structural  change.  As economies  grow,  they  go  through  major  shifts  in 
their  overall  structure,  for  instance,  from  heavy,  energy  intensive  indus- 
tries  to  lighter,  more  energy  efficient  industries.  This  trend  will  affect 
the  overall  energy  intensity  of  the  sectors  in  regional  economies.  For 
each  scenario,  we must  specify  how  the  energy  intensity  of  each  sector 
will  change  according  to  such  structural  shifts  (here  we  refer  to  the 
unabated  energy  intensity,  which  is defined  as the  intensity  independent 
of  energy  conservation).  As  a  first  step  we  assume  that  each  region 
follows  the  typical  trend  shown  in Figure  3, namely,  as the  activity  level 
of  a sector  increases  (eg as private  consumption  or  industrial  output  per 
capita  increases)  then  the  average  energy  intensity  of  the  sector  first 
increases,  and  afterwards  decreases  and  levels  off  to  a  minimum.  The 
second  step  is  to  estimate  where  each  sector  of  each  region  currently 
falls  on  this  curve.  This  estimate  is based  on  the  trend  of  activity  levels 
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Industry  Sector:  value  added  indu5trial  output  Servkes  Sector:  value  added  commercial  servkes  (USSlcap  yr) 
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Oceania  4440 
Japan  4682 
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Residential  Sector:  private  consumption 
(UStka~  yr) 
eadh  A  Baelhm B  ti~line  c 
nasdine  A  &ulim  5  &ullne  c 
1990  2050  2100  2050  2qoa  2050  2100 
12168  38002  67161  26660  37588  52075  117273 
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1399  5134  15768  3073  6628  8460  37866 
278  1073  4025  655  1582  1760  9312 
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105.7  1096 
and  energy  data  from  1970 to  1990. After  estimating  the current  location 
of  each  sector  on  this  curve,  we  then  use  the  data  for  activity  levels 
(Table  3) to extrapolate  to  the  trend  of energy  intensity  due  to  structural 
change.  Trends  in energy  intensity  for  the  important  industry  sector  of 
Baseline  A  are  depicted  in  Figure  4.  Here  the  shapes  of  the  curves  are 
more  important  than  the  magnitude  of  the  curves  because  measures  of 
activity  are  not  directly  comparable  between  regions.  Note  that  the 
different  regions  are  expected  to  be in different  phases  of the  theoretical 
curve  (Figure  3)  during  the  scenario  period.  Two  regions  depicted  in 
Figure  4  are  in  the  early  part  of  the  theoretical  curve,  China  plus 
Centrally  Planned  Asia  (moving  from  around  point  ‘B’  to  ‘C’),  and 
Structural  Change 
Figure  3.  Idealized  curve  of 
structural  change  leading  to  change 
in  energy  intensity  of  a  sector  in  a 
regional  economy.  Relative  Activity  level 
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Energy intensity  Industry - heat 
-Latin  America 
Figure 4.  Structural  change  leading  to 
change  in  energy  intensity  for  the 
industry  (heat)  sector  in  Baseline  A. 
Note  that  the  horizontal  axis  is activity 
level  rather  than  time,  so the  temporal 
trend  of  the  assumed  structural 
changes  depends  on  how  fast  activity 
levels  increase. 
0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14 
Value  Added  Industry [lo00  US $ /cap.] 
Latin  America  (moving  from  around  point  ‘A’ to  ‘C’). Meanwhile,  the 
CIS  moves  through  the  middle  towards  the  end  of  the  curve  (moving 
from  around  point  ‘B’ to  ‘D’).  OECD  Europe  is expected  to  be  in  the 
most  advanced  phase  of the curve  (around  point  ‘D’). 
Technological  change.  While  large-scale  structural  changes  lead  to  shifts 
in  the  overall  energy  intensity  of  the  economy,  steady  improvements  in 
technology  make  new  energy  using  appliances  more  energy  efficient, 
often  at  no  or  even  negative  costs  and  irrespective  of  changes  in  fuel 
and  electricity  prices.  These  improvements  are  taken  into  account  in the 
scenarios  by  specifying  the  rate  at  which  new  energy  using  devices 
become  more  energy  efficient  over  time.  This  so-called  ‘marginal  rate  of 
autonomous  energy  efficiency  improvement’  must  be  specified  for  every 
sector  and  region.  Selected  results  are  given  in  Figure  5. For  the  indus- 
trial  sector  of OECD  Europe,  current  improvements  in energy  efficiency 
are  assumed  to  continue  at  about  0.25%  per  year,  irrespective  of  fuel 
prices.  In  the  CIS,  where  industry  is more  energy  intensive  than  OECD 
Europe,  a  higher  rate  (0.65%  per  year)  is  assumed.  A  high  rate  of 
improvement  is  also  assumed  for  China  plus  Centrally  Planned  Asia 
Marginal  Energy  Intensity  Industry - heat 
Figure  5.  Technological  change 
leading  to  change  in  marginal  energy 
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End-Use Energy Prices 
(relative  to 1990) 
4.0  ,p 
Industry - heat 
Figure 6. End  use  energy  prices  for 
the  industry  (heat)  sector  in  Baseline 
-  _ -  China + C.P. Asia 
-Latin  America 
(0.60%  per  year)  which  reflects  a  common  view  that  this  region  will 
strive  to  quickly  modernize  its  industries.  Latin  America,  however,  is 
assumed  to  continue  with  its relatively  low current  rate  of  improvement 
(0.35%  per  year). 
Energy  prices.  Consumers  react  to  steeper  energy  prices  by  reducing 
energy  use.  This  effect  is  simulated  in  the  model  explicitly.  The  fuel 
price  changes  that  stimulate  energy  conservation  are computed  internally 
in the  model  as a function  of  fuel  supply  and  are  based  on  convergence 
towards  global  fuel  prices.  In  the  example  for  the  industry  (heat)  sector 
shown  in  Figure  6,  relative  price  changes  are  close  for  OECD  Europe 
and  China  plus  Centrally  Planned  Asia  and  substantially  higher  for 
Latin  America  and  CIS.  The  differences  in  trends  for  different  regions 
are  mainly  due  to  the  convergence  of  fuel prices  towards  global  prices. 
To  run  the  model,  other  energy  related  data  must  also  be  specified. 
The  most  important  ones  are  fuelwood  consumption,  commercial 
biofuels  consumption  and  the  generation  mix  for  electric  power  genera- 
tion. 
The  IMAGE  2  model  combines  the  preceding  factors  in  estimating 
changes  in the  overall  energy  intensities  of  each  region,  and  their  future 
energy  consumption.  These  are reported  along  with other  scenario  results 
later  in the  paper. 
Box  2.  Main factors affecting agricultural production 
Factors specified for scenario: 
Trade  of agricultural  products 
Animal  husbandry 
Cropping  intensity 
Technological  improvements  in crop  yield 
Factors computed internally by IMAGE 2 
Agricultural  demand 
Potential  productivity  of land  due  to climate 
268 Baseline  scenarios  of  global  environmental  change:  J  Alcamo  et  al 
“FAO,  Agrostat  PC.  Land  Use, 
Computerized  Information  Series  l/7, 
Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  of  the 
United  Nations,  Rome,  1991 
“M  W  Rosegrant.  M  Agcaoili-Saombilla 
and  N  D  Perez,  Global  Food  Projections 
to 2020:  implications  for  Investment,  Food 
Agriculture  and  the  Environment, 
Discussion  Paper  5,  International  Food 
Policy  Research  Institute  (IFPRI), 
Washington,  DC,  1995 
Computing  change  in agricultural  production  and land use 
Land  cover  change  is an essential  aspect  of global  environmental  change. 
For  example,  deforestation  leads  to  releases  of  greenhouse  and  other 
gases,  expansion  of  agricultural  and  urban  land  endangers  natural 
ecosystem  habitats,  and  forestation  increases  the  uptake  of  CO2  from 
the  atmosphere.  IMAGE  2 computes  changes  in  land  cover  by  taking 
into  account  the  need  for  agricultural  land  (used  here  to  mean  pasture 
and  cropland,  and  managed  forests).  The  model  computes  these  changes 
in land  use  by  computing  the  changing  demand  in  13 world  regions  for 
livestock,  crops,  and  forest  products  and  the  amount  of  crop,  pasture, 
and  forest  land  required  to  provide  these  products. 
To  calculate  a  scenario  of  agricultural  production,  IMAGE  2  takes 
into  account  the  factors  presented  in  Box  2. The  need  for  agricultural 
land  will depend,  first  and  foremost,  on  regional  agricultural  demands 
which  are  computed  as described  below.  However,  for  some  regions,  the 
amount  of  agricultural  land  will  also  depend  on  the  amount  of  food 
traded  with  other  regions,  and  this  must  also  be  specified  for  each 
scenario.  In  addition,  there  are  a  number  of  factors  that  are  important 
to  estimating  requirements  for  agricultural  land  because  they  influence 
the  amount  of  food  that  can  be  produced  per  hectare  of  land.  One  of 
these  factors  is the  effect  of  climate  on  potential  crop  productivity,  and 
this  is computed  internally  by  the  model.  The  other  three  factors  of  this 
type  must  be  specified  for  each  scenario.  They  are:  animal  husbandry, 
cropping  intensity,  and  technological  improvements  in crop  yield. 
Agricultural  demand.  Agricultural  demand  consists  of the need for all agri- 
cultural  commodities,  specifically  meat  and  crops  consumed  by  humans, 
and  feed  required  by livestock  (demand  for  forest  products  are computed 
separately  in the model,  while the demand  for commercial  biofuels  is gener- 
ated  by the  Energy  Economy  model).  To  compute  regional  demands,  the 
model  multiplies  per  capita  consumption  of  food  times  population  esti- 
mates.  The  main  task,  therefore,  is to compute  per capita  consumption  of 
food.  IMAGE  2 computes  this consumption  under  the main  premise  that 
people  eat  more  food  as  their  income  increases,  up  to  a  particular 
‘preferred’  consumption  level. Of course,  in reality  food  prices  also have a 
major  influence  on  consumption  levels  -  These  are  taken  into  account 
indirectly  in  the  model  by  making  food  consumption  dependent  on  the 
productivity  and  availability  of  new agricultural  lands  -  The  idea  is that 
as good  land is used up, prices increase  and consumption  is dampened. 
Summing  up  to  this  point,  IMAGE  2  computes  per  capita  food 
consumption  based  on (1) income,  (2) land  productivity  and  availability, 
and  (3)  preferred  level  of  food  consumption.  The  first  factor  is  taken 
from  the  GDP  per  capita  assumptions  for  each  region,  specified  in 
Table  2.  The  second  factor  is  computed  internally  in  the  IMAGE  2 
model.  The  third  factor,  preferred  level  of  consumption,  is very  difficult 
to  specify  because  it  varies  greatly  from  region  to  region,  and  depends 
on  difficult  to  quantify  cultural  and  geographical  factors.  Hence  we 
take  a  pragmatic  approach  and  run  the  IMAGE  2 model  ‘backwards’ 
from  1970 to  2010  in  order  to  obtain  the  trend  of  this  factor.  This  is 
done  by  specifying  for  this  period  what  the  model  is  supposed  to 
compute  ~  per  capita  consumption  of  different  foods  from  1970  to 
2010.  Data  for  food  consumption  comes  from  AGROSTAT19  for  1970 
to  1990, and  from  trend  estimates  of  IFPRI”  from  1990 to  2010.  The 
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other  important  factors  -  income  and  land  productivity/availability,  are 
assigned  or  internally  calculated  as we noted  above.  Therefore,  we can 
back  calculate  from  the  model  a  rough  estimate  of  the  preferred 
consumption  level  of  the  different  foods  in  different  regions  for  this 
period.  We then  extrapolate  these  trends  from  2010 to  2100. (The  same 
estimates  of preferred  consumption  are  used for  all three  baseline  scenar- 
ios.)  The  preferred  consumption  level  together  with  the  computed 
consumption  level  for  Baeline  A  in  Latin  America  are  shown  later  in 
Figure  11. The  last step  in computing  agricultural  demand  is to multiply 
the  computed  regional  per  capita  consumption  by  population  data  in 
Table  1  to  obtain  the  tonnes  of  agricultural  products  of  each  type 
needed  in each  region  and  time  step. 
Food  trade.  The  baseline  scenarios  of world  food  trade  are based  on three 
very  simple  rules  based  on  ‘self  sufficiency  ratios’  (total  production 
divided  by total  consumption):  (1) Regions  that  currently  export  a parti- 
cular  agricultural  commodity  will continue  to do  so in the  future,  (2) the 
fraction  of this export  relative  to  the  total  production  of this commodity 
remains  the  same  ie  the  ‘self  sufficiency  ratios’  remain  the  same,  and 
(3) currently  importing  countries  maintain  their  current  dependence  on 
imports.  The  same  assumptions  are  used  for  all three  baseline  scenarios. 
Hence,  if  agricultural  production  in  a  region  increases,  then  the  total 
amount  of exports  will also  increase.  Of course,  this  is just  one  of many 
possible  ways  of specifying  a scenario  of  food  trade,  but  considering  the 
complexity  of the  subject  it has  the  virtue  of being  simple. 
Animal  husbandry.  Some  factors  concerned  with the development  of live- 
stock  can  have  an  important  effect  on  estimating  future  feed  require- 
ments  and  pasture  and  rangeland.  One  factor  in  particular  is  animal 
productivity,  ie  the  amount  of  meat  produced  per  animal.  For  this 
factor  we  assume  that  industrialized  countries  are  close  to  their  maxi- 
mum  value  and  that  other  regions  will reach  the  current  OECD  Europe 
level  when  their  GDP  per  capita  reaches  the  current  OECD  level 
(Table  4). Hence,  the trend  of this factor  varies  from  scenario  to  scenario 
along  with  economic  assumptions  of the  scenarios. 
Cropping  intensity.  An  important  variable  affecting  the  overall  land 
needed  in a region  for cropland  is the number  of crops  grown  per hectare 
of land  over  a calendar  year.  This  must  be specified  for  each  scenario  and 
Table  4.  Assumptions  for  Improvement  In  productlvlty  of  boo1  osttle 
Canada  86  99  135  163  163  0.45  0.36  0.53 
USA  99  121  145  163  163  0.27  0.18  0.35 
Latin  America  35  36  41  75  162  1.38  0.80  1.36 
Africa  16  24  24  30  57  0.79  0.31  1.19 
OECD  Europe  123  148  156  162  162  0.09  0.00  0.17 
Eastern  Europe  100  119  125  138  156  0.25  0.07  0.22 
CIS  95  117  119  130  146  0.20  0.05  0.22 
Middle  East  23  46  49  73  162  1.16  0.47  0.67 
India  +  S  Asia  7  9  10  15  47  1.53  0.77  2.01 
China  +  C  P  Asia  5  14  16  29  121  1.95  1.04  1.90 
East  Asia  16  27  34  76  162  1.63  1.31  1.66 
Oceania  53  81  124  162  162  0.63  0.54  0.71 
Japan  113  155  159  162  162  0.04  0.00  0.12 
Productivity  (kghnlmsl  yr)  Rate  of Increase  In  productfvlty  (Wyr) 
Bsseli-  A  Bssellne  A  2asellne 2  Bssellne  C 
is70  **so  2010  2050  2100  1w+2100  ieoo-2100  iso+2ioo 
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Trapping  intensity  is defined  as  the  number  of 
crops  grown  each  year  per  unit  of cropland  in a 
region.  For  example,  if  agricultural  land  is  left 
fallow  in  1  out  of  5  years,  then  the  cropping 
intensity  is 4/5,  or  0.8. 
1970  1220  2010  2050  2100 
Canada  0.444  0.566  0.625  0.631  0.631 
USA  0.469  0.495  0.545  0.550  0.550 
Latin  America  0.645  0.612  0.869  0.969  1.000 
Africa  0.663  0.726  0.641  0.959  1.000 
OECD Europe  0.699  0.730  0.803  0.811  0.811 
Eastern  Europe  0.626  0.741  0.815  0.623  0.823 
CIS  0.624  0.562  0.640  0.647  0.647 
Middle  East  0.577  0.695  0.760  0.866  0.900 
India  +  S Asia  0.906  0.960  1.102  1.249  1.300 
China  +  C P Asia  1.269  1.411  1.527  1.650  1.700 
East  Asia  1.044  1.086  1.261  1.430  1.500 
Oceania  0.314  0.300  0.330  0.333  0.333 
Japan  0.974  0.626  0.911  0.920  0.920 
region  over  the  scenario  period.  There  is now  an  upward  trend  in  this 
factor,  and  each  of  the  baseline  scenarios  assume  that  this  trend  will 
continue  up  to  a region  specific  maximum.  Under  Baseline  A (Table  5) 
cropping  intensities  of temperate  cereals  sharply  increase  for  most  devel- 
oping  regions  up  to  the  second  half  of  the  next  century,  while  they  level 
off  in  the  early  part  of  the  century  in  industrialized  regions.  The  same 
assumptions  are  used  for  all baseline  scenarios. 
Technological  improvement  of  crop  yields.  Improvement  in management 
techniques,  crop  varieties,  and  machinery  have  contributed  to  a  steady 
increase  in crop  yields  throughout  the  world.  This  rate  of  technological 
improvement  in  crop  yield  must  be  specified  for  each  scenario  and 
region.  The  industrialized  regions  are  assumed  to  have  already  passed 
the  ‘green  revolution’  although  yields  will continue  to  improve  at  some- 
what  lower  rates  due  to  biotechnology  (Table  6).  Scenarios  for  these 
regions  are  based  on  a  slowing  down  of  the  1970 to  1990 trends.  For 
the developing  regions,  trends  up to  2010 are  taken  from  Alexandratos2’ 
which  assumes  that  these  regions  will rapidly  increase  crop  yields.  This 
rapid  rate  of  improvement  levels  off  after  2030.  Different  rates  of 
improvement  are  assigned  to  the  different  baseline  scenarios,  dependent 
on  their  rate  of economic  growth  (Table  2). 
Factors  not  taken  into  account.  Before  continuing,  it is important  to  note 
2’N  Alexandratos  (ed)  Agriculture: 
two  important  factors  not  yet  included  in IMAGE  2 land  cover  calcula- 
Towards  2070,  An  FAO  study.  Wiley,  tions.  First,  the  future  degradation  of  land  is not  taken  into  account.  It 
Chichester,  1995  is  crucial,  of  course,  to  factor  in  the  loss  of  agricultural  productivity 
Table  6.  Assumptions  for  teshnolo#osl  improvements  in  tempsrste  core&s  yietd  (1990  = 
1 .O) 
Canada  1.01 
USA  0.77 
Latin  America  0.59 
Africa  0.73 
OECD Europe  0.64 
Eastern  Europe  0.63 
CIS  0 75 
Middle  East  0.71 
India  +  S Asia  0.60 
China  +  C P Asia  0.39 
East  Asra  0.65 
Oceania  0.62 
Japan  0.62 
1970 
2ssotine  A 
1990  2010  2020  2100 
1  .oo  1.10  1.28  1.45 
1  .oo  1.27  1.60  1.02 
l,oo  1.37  2.17  2.60 
1.00  1.37  2.17  2.60 
l..OO  1.10  1.21  1.21 
1.00  1.27  1.47  1.61 
1.00  1.27  1.60  1.82 
1  .oo  1.27  1.60  1.02 
1.00  1.37  1.92  1.92 
1  .oo  1.27  1.53  1.53 
1  .oo  1.10  1.26  1.45 
1 00  1.27  1.60  1.62 





1.36  1.47 
1.66  1.97 
2.32  3.16 
2.32  3.40 
1.21  1.21 
1.56  1.61 
1.68  1.97 
1.66  1.97 
1.92  1.92 
1.53  1.53 
1.35  1.53 
1.66  1.97 
1.36  1.47 
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because  of  overuse  and  mismanagement.  We  note,  however,  that  the 
model  does take  into  account  the  current  low productivity  of some  areas 
(such  as  the  Sahel  region  of  Africa)  because  of  land  degradation.  The 
net  effect  of  this  omission  is  to  overestimate  the  future  availability  of 
agricultural  land.  The  other  major  omission  is not  including  the potential 
for  new  irrigated  agricultural  land,  although  current  irrigated  land  is 
included.  This  omission  has  the  opposite  effect  of  land  degradation,  in 
that  it leads  to  an  underestimate  of  the  future  availability  of  agricultural 
land.  Future  versions  of  IMAGE  2  will  include  these  factors,  and  we 
can  then  investigate  if these  two  factors  compensate  for  each  other. 
Box 3. Main factors affecting emissions of air pollutants 
Factors specified for scenario: 
Emission  factors 
Factors computed internally by IMAGE 2: 
For  energy  emissions:  primary  energy  consumption 
For  industry  emissions:  level of industrial  activity 
For  land  use  emissions:  size of  agricultural  area,  and  other  land 
use indicators 
Computing  changes  in emissions  and  in  the  state  of  the  atmosphere  and 
climate 
The  IMAGE  2  model  computes  regional  emissions  of  all  radiatively 
important  gases as well as sulphur  dioxide  which  leads  to  the  radiatively 
important  sulphate  aerosol.  For  the  baseline  scenarios,  however, 
sulphate  aerosol  in  the  atmosphere  is held  constant  at  its  1990 level,  so 
that  the influence  of changing  sulphur  dioxide  emissions  can  be examined 
through  sensitivity  analysis.  Emission  calculations  depend  on  a  number 
of  driving  forces  computed  internally  by  the  model  (Box  3)  as well  as 
emission  factors  that  must  be specified  for  each  scenario.  For  the  scenar- 
ios  in  this  paper  we  hold  constant  for  the  entire  simulation  period  the 
estimated  1990 value  of  these  emission  factors  in all emission  categories. 
These  emission  factors  are documented  and  explained  in de Vries  et a1.22 
Based  on  these  emissions,  IMAGE  2  computes  the  atmospheric 
buildup  of  many  important  pollutants,  including  carbon  dioxide  (CO& 
methane  (CH4),  nitrous  oxide  (N,O),  nitrogen  oxides  (NO,),  carbon 
monoxide  (CO),  volatile  organic  compounds  (VOC),  sulphur  dioxide 
(S02),  and  various  halocarbons.  The  method  for  these  computations  is 
reported  in  Krol  and  van  der  Woerd.23  Increased  levels  of  greenhouse 
gas  emissions  lead  to  changes  in  surface  temperature  and  precipitation 
as  described  in  de  Haan  et  a1.24 The  coupling  between  submodels  in 
IMAGE  2 simulate  some  of  the  feedbacks  that  occur  in nature  between 
the  atmosphere  and  terrestrial  environment.  These  feedback  processes 
can  have  an important  impact  on  results  as we will describe  later. 
Results  of  baseline  scenarios 
“de  Vries  et al,  op tit, Ref  4 
23Krol  and  van  der  Woerd,  op tit,  Ref  10 
24de Haan  et a/, op tit, Ref  9 
Here  we present  an  overview  of  future  global  environmental  change  as 
computed  in  the  baseline  scenarios.  Because  of  space  limitations,  we 
focus  on global  average  results  and  details  from  4 of the  13 world  regions 
covered  by  the  IMAGE  2 model  (China  plus  Centrally  Planned  Asia, 
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Figure  7.  Regional  energy  intensity 
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Baseline scenarios  of global environmental  change:  J  Alcamo  et al 
OECD  Europe,  Latin  America,  and  the  former  Soviet  Union,  now 
known  as  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  (CIS)).  These 
regions  were  selected  because  they  represent  a  wide  range  of  economic 
and  geographic  situations.  Results  from  other  regions  are  also  presented 
when  particularly  noteworthy. 
Energy 
We  discussed  previously  how  certain  assumptions  of  the  scenario  and 
model  lead  to  higher  energy  intensity  of  the  economy,  and  some  to 
lower.  Figure  7 shows  that  their  net  effect  is to  decrease  energy  intensity 
in Baseline  A.  For  the  world  as a whole,  energy  intensity  decreases  by  a 
factor  of  2.8  between  1990 and  2100.  These  estimates  are  in  line  with 
the  range  of  long  term  energy  scenarios  found  in  the  scientific  litera- 
ture.25 Another  important  outcome  is that  the different  regions  converge 
towards  a common  energy  intensity  over  the long-run  (Figure  7). 
We  now  examine  calculations  of  secondary  energy  consumption 
because  they  indicate  the  amount  of  energy  needed  to  provide  future 
energy  services  and  the  sectors  where  it will be most  needed.  Results  for 
Baseline  A are  depicted  in Figure  8. In OECD  Europe  the  use of energy 
stabilizes  around  2035  because  the  rate  of  improvement  of  energy  effi- 
ciency  counteracts  the  relatively  slow  rate  at  which  economic  activity 
expands.  The  same  trend  is  observed  for  other  OECD  regions  in 
Baseline  A.  By  comparison,  secondary  energy  use  in  the  CIS  first  sags 
in the  1990s because  of economic  recession,  and  then  increases  in accor- 
dance  with  the  economic  growth  presecribed  in  Baseline  A.  The  domi- 
nant  sectors  in  these  regions  are  transport,  followed  by  industry. 
Meanwhile  in  China  plus  Centrally  Planned  Asia  and  Latin  America, 
secondary  energy  use  rapidly  increases  until  the  end  of  the  next  century 
(Figure  8). In both  China  and  Latin  America  industry  is the most  impor- 
tant  energy  using  sector.  In 2100, transport  is the second  most  important 
sector  in Latin  America,  but  in China  the residential,  services,  and  ‘other’ 
sectors  are  tied  for  second  place. 
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To  sum up  the  findings  of  Baseline  A,  secondary  energy  use  stabilizes 
in  the  coming  decades  in  OECD  regions.  In  other  regions  it  continues 
to  sharply  increase  until  the end  of the  next  century.  Globally,  the indus- 
try  and  transport  sectors  are  about  equally  important. 
While  secondary  energy  consumption  is a good  indicator  of the sectors 
of  importance  to  future  energy  demand,  primary  energy  consumption 
and  its fuel profile  are  better  indicators  of the  source  of future  emissions 
of greenhouse  and  other  gases. Computed  fuel profiles  can  be very  differ- 
ent  between  countries  because  their  domestic  fuel  resources  are  quite 
different,  and  because  they  have  different  economic  capabilities  to 
import  fuels.  As  an  example  of  these  differences,  in  Baseline  A OECD 
Europe  maintains  its reliance  on  oil while  increasing  use  of  nuclear  and 
commercial  biofuels.  Meanwhile,  China  become  even  more  reliant  on  its 
coal  resources  (Figure  9). 
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A comparison  of  results  for  the  three  baselines  indicates  the  influence 
of  different  driving  force  assumptions  on  primary  energy  consumption 
(Figure  10). Note  that  primary  energy  consumption  of OECD  Europe  is 
about  78 EJ  in  2100  (Figure  9)  and  secondary  energy  consumption 
about  57 EJ (Figure  8). This  implies  an overall  conversion  rate  of  73%. 
For  OECD  Europe,  the  three  baseline  scenarios  show  similar  trends, 
namely  an  increase  till 2025 and  a decrease  afterwards.  Although  Base- 
line C has a much  higher  rate  of economic  growth  and  economic  activity 
than  Baseline  A, its primary  energy  consumption  is not  much  larger  than 
in  Baseline  A.  This  is because  Baseline  C  also  assumes  a  faster  rate  of 
improvement  in  energy  efficiency  which  compensates  somewhat  for  its 
higher  level of activity.  This  is significant  from  the point  of view of emis- 
sions because  a small difference  in primary  energy  consumption  implies  a 
small  difference  in  emissions  between  these  scenarios.  Baseline  B, with 
275 Baseline scenarios  of global  environmental  change:  J  Alcamo  et al 
(A) 
,20  Primary  Energy  OECD  Europe 
80 
80 
1975  2000 
(B) 
Primarv  Enernv 
lower  assumptions  for  population  and  economic  growth  leads  to 
substantially  lower  primary  energy  consumption  and  emissions 
(Figure  10).  In  the  CIS  and  Latin  America,  the  economic  growth  rates 
of  Baseline  C  lead  to  much  higher  primary  energy  consumption  than 
Baseline  A  because  the  energy  intensity  of  industry  and  transportation 
is  assumed  to  remain  higher  than  in  OECD  regions.  In  China  Plus 
Centrally  Planned  Asia,  as  well  as  other  developing  regions  in  the 
model,  primary  energy  use  greatly  increases  in  Baseline  A  and  C,  but 
stabilizes  in  the  early  part  of  the  next  century  under  Baseline  B.  Note 
the  great  range  in  estimates  of  the  three  baseline  cases  (Figure  lo),  indi- 
cating  a  similar  uncertainty  range  for  future  emissions. 
In  summing  up,  energy  use  in  OECD  regions  increases  in  the  coming 
decades  and  goes  down  afterwards  for  all  three  baseline  scenarios.  In 
the  other  regions  it  steadily  increases  under  the  two  highest  scenarios, 
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but  stabilizes  in  some  regions  under  the  lowest  scenario.  On  the  global 
level,  primary  energy  consumption  stabilizes  by  2025  for  the  lowest 
scenario,  whereas  for  the  other  two  scenarios  it increases  by  a  factor  of 
4 to  5 between  1990 and  2100. 
Agriculture 
As we  have  seen,  the  baseline  scenarios  indicate  that  the  world  energy 
system  will  undergo  important  regional  changes.  We  will now  see  that 
vigorous  changes  also  occur  in  the  world’s  terrestrial  system.  We  first 
examine  the  effect  of economic  and  population  growth  on  food  demand 
and  then  describe  the  influence  of these  demands  and  climate  change  on 
changing  agricultural  land,  forest  land  and  other  land  cover. 
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Per  capita food  demand 
We begin with  Baseline  A and  the per capita  consumption  of agricultural 
commodities.  We summarize  results  by aggregating  the crops  and  animal 
products  computed  by .IMAGE  2 into  two  large  categories  (a)  ‘AnimaI 
Products+‘,  which  have  the larger  land  requirements  per unit  commodity 
and  consist  of  all  animal  products  plus  oil  crops,  and  (b)  ‘Cereals+‘, 
which  have  smaller  land  requirements  per  unit  commodity  and  are 
made  up of all cereals  together  with  pulses,  roots  and  tubers. 
In  OECD  Europe,  consumption  grows  slowly  because  it  is  already 
near  its  preferred  level;  cereals+  grow  somewhat  faster  than  animal 
products+  because  of  the  assumed  preference  for  non-meat  foods 
(Table  7).  These  trends  are  typical  of  all  industrialized  regions  under 
Baseline  A.  By  contrast,  there  is  a  relatively  rapid  increase  in  the 
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consumption  of  all  crops  in  the  region  of  China  plus  Centrally 
Planned  Asia,  as  income  increases  and  pent-up  demand  is  satisfied. 
This  trend  is typical  of  the  other  developing  regions  in  the  model. 
Meanwhile  Latin  America,  which  maintains  an  economic  level 
between  the  industrialized  and  developing  regions,  increases  its 
consumption  of  food  but  at  a  lower  rate  than  China.  By  2100  total 
consumption  of  commodities  is  close  to  the  assumed  ‘preferred 
consumption  level  (Figure  11).  This  is  because  income  increases,  and 
there  is  no  computed  shortage  of  agricultural  land.  However,  not  all 
types  of  consumption  converge  to  their  preferred  level  at  the  same 
rate.  The  consumption  of  cereals+  converges  much  faster  than  animal 
products+  because  land  requirements  of  cereals  (and  roughly  their 
price)  is relatively  lower. 
279 Baseline scenarios  of global environmental  change:  J  Alcamo  et al 
Figure 10.  Contd. 
(E) 
Primary  energy  consumption  World total 
1990  2000  2025  2050  2075  i 
Population  of  livestock 
The  number  of livestock  has  an important  influence  on  the  total  amount 
of  agricultural  land  because  of  their  need  for  pasture  land  or  feed.  To 
compute  the  number  of  livestock  needed  to  satisfy  the  desired  consump- 
tion  of  meat  and  dairy  products,  the  model  multiplies  the  per  capita 
consumption  of  animal  products  times  population,  while  taking  into 
account  that  the  productivity  of  animals  is improving  at  the  same  time. 
Under  Baseline  A,  the  number  of  cattle  goes  down  in  OECD  Europe 
and,  after  a  few  decades,  in  the  CIS,  despite  the  increasing  per  capita 
consumption  of  beef  products  noted  above  (Figure  12). This  is because 
of  the  decrease  in  human  population,  and  because  the  productivity  of 
livestock  is  assumed  to  increase  (Table  4).  By  contrast,  increasing  per 
capita  demand  together  with  an  increase  in  population  leads  to  a  large 
initial  growth  in  the  number  of  cattle  in  Latin  America  and  in  China 
plus  Centrally  Planned  Asia  (Figure  12).  Here  the  number  of  cattle 
decreases  in the  second  half  of  the  next  century  not  only  because  of  the 
same  factors  noted  for  OECD  Europe,  but  in  China  also  due  to  the 
limited  amount  of  area  where  agricultural  land  can  expand  in  the 
Table 7.  Caloric intake (al/cap  dmy)  In 5asdne  A’ 
1970  1990  2010  2050  2100 
Cereals+ 
Latin America  1274  1240  1303  1415  1440 
OECD Europe  1076  1043  1096  1195  1267 
CIS  1703  1445  1435  1441  1466 
China +  C P Asia  1694  1966  2171  2495  2715 
Animal products+ 
Latin America  427  606  710  943  1069 
OECD Europa  901  1167  1274  1354  1395 
CIS  752  943  969  1030  1012 
ONote that  the  grand  total  figures  are  higher  China +  C P Asia  140  326  422  610  900 
than  the  sum  of the  categories  ‘Cereals+’  and  Grand total 
‘Animal  Products+‘.  The  fraction  of  intake  of  Latin America  2476  2674  2914  3414  3635 
the  products  that  are  not  modelled  (like  fish,  OECD Europe  3215  3467  3710  3990  4165 
vegetables,  and  permanent  crops)  is  kept  CIS  3309  3363  3434  3504  3540 
constant  and  taken  into  account  in  the  grand  China +  C P Asia  2005  2623  2941  3522  4100 
total. 
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Figure  11.  Computed  per  capita 
consumption  of  agricultural 
commodities  for  Latin  America  in 
Baseline  A.  Shown  also  is  the 
assumed  ‘preferred  consumption’ 
level. 
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future.  In  China  plus  Centrally  Planned  Asia  and  other  developing 
regions  (for  example  Africa  and  India  plus  South  Asia)  the consumption 
of  animal  products+  does  not  reach  the  preferred  level.  This  is because 
land  requirements  for  these  products  are  high compared  to cereals+. 
For  the  world  as  a  whole,  the  Baseline  A  and  Baseline  C  scenarios 
show  similar  trends  for  the  number  of animals.  The  number  of cattle  for 
example  increases  from  around  1.4 billion  in  1990 and  levels off  in 2040 
at  around  2.5 billion,  then  declines  after  2050 down  to  around  1.6 to  1.7 
billion  in  2100 (Figure  13). This  is because  Baseline  C  assumes  a  faster 
growth  of  animal  productivity  which  compensates  for  its  faster  growth 
in  demand  for  beef  and  milk  due  to  a  higher  economic  growth.  The 
level  of  cattle  in a number  of  developing  regions  is limited  by  the  avail- 
ability  of suitable  land,  as discussed  in the previous  section.  This  explains 
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why  the  maximum  level  of cattle  in Baseline  B can  be close  to  the  maxi- 
mum  level  in  the  two  highest  scenarios.  Due  to  the  lower  growth  of 
population  and  economy  this  maximum  level  in  Baseline  B  is reached 
about  30 years  later  than  in the  other  two  scenarios. 
Total agricultural  production 
The  sum  of  human  consumption  of  crops  together  with  consumption 
of  feed  by  animals  leads  to  total  crop  demands.  Figure  14 shows  that 
the  total  demand  for  temperate  cereals  in  OECD  Europe  levels  off 
because  of  opposing  trends  -  per  capita  consumption  slowly  increases 
as we have  seen  above,  but  the  human  population  goes  down,  and  the 
number  of  feed  consuming  livestock  levels  off  as  we  have  also 
mentioned  above.  Consequently,  the  total  demand  for  temperate 
cereals  is  almost  constant.  Meanwhile,  in  the  CIS  total  demand  for 
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cattle  in three  baseline  scenarios. 
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temperate  cereals  increases  up  to  2030 because  population  continues  to 
go up,  and  then  declines  afterwards  as population  stabilizes  and  animal 
productivity  goes  up. 
In  China  plus  Centrally  Planned  Asia,  total  demand  for  temperate 
cereals  rapidly  increases  in  the  next  century  reflecting  the  growth  in 
human  population  and per capita  consumption  (Figure  14). This  is repre- 
sentative  for  the  developing  regions  where  the  availability  of  suitable 
lands  become  limiting,  such  as  Africa  and  India  plus  South  Asia.  In 
Latin  America,  total  demand  for  temperate  cereals  also  increases  in the 
next  century,  but  at  a  lower  rate  than  in  China.  The  main  factor  in 
Latin  America  is the  growth  in human  population. 
For  the  global  production  of  temperate  cereals  a  rapid  increase  in 
the  first  part  of  the  next  century  is followed  by  a  slow  increase  in  the 
second  part  of  the  century  (Figure  15). Comparing  the  three  baseline 
scenarios  show  that  the  trend  in global  production  of  temperate  cereals 
is reflecting  the  trend  of  human  population  growth.  This  indicates  that 
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Figure  15. World  total  production  of 
temperate  cereals  in  three  baseline 
scenarios.  1990  2000  2025  2050  2075  2100 
the  differences  in  the  per  capita  consumption  due  to  changes  in  econ- 
omy  and  the  availability  of  suitable  agricultural  land  and  the  differ- 
ences  in  the  consumption  of  temperate  cereals  by  animals  are 
balancing  each  other  on  the  global  level.  Baseline  C  leads  to  a  some- 
what  higher  production  of  temperate  cereals  than  Baseline  A.  This  is 
due  to  the  assumption  that  the  technological  improvement  of  crop 
yield  is  higher  in  Baseline  C  than  in  Baseline  A,  which  leads  to  a 
higher  production  in  those  regions  that  use  up  all  their  suitable  land 
in  the  scenarios  (China  plus  Centrally  Planned  Asia,  Africa  and  India 
plus  South  Asia). 
Summing  up.  The  trends  in  crop  demands  are  quite  different  in  each 
region,  although  as a  rule  they  are  stabilizing  or  declining  in industria- 
lized  regions,  and  increasing  sharply  in  developing  regions  until  the 
second  half  of the  next  century.  These  trends  result  mainly  from  changes 
in the  per capita  consumption  of different  types  of commodities,  the  rate 
of  growth  of  human  population,  and  improvements  in  the  productivity 
of animals. 
The  extent  of  agricultural  land 
Changing  food  demand  is the  major  factor  driving  the  demand  for  agri- 
cultural  land.  However,  other  factors  also  play  an  important  role.  Of 
particular  significance  are  technological  developments  and  climate 
which  will lead  to  changes  in crop  and  pasture  yield  per  hectare.  In  the 
baseline  scenarios,  technology  is assumed  to  have  a net effect  of improv- 
ing yield  in each  region  (see Table  6). The  effect  of climate  change  can  be 
positive  or  negative,  and  is computed  at each  time  step  according  to  the 
climate  computed  by the model  at that  time  step.  Later  we discuss  clima- 
te’s impact  on  crop  productivity.  The  net  result  of  these  factors  on  the 
yield  of  temperate  cereals  is  shown  in  Figure  16.  In  OECD  Europe 
there  is almost  no  net  effect  of  climate  change  as can  be  seen  from  the 
trend  in average  yield  after  a few  decades  when  technological  improve- 
ments  have  reached  their  maximum  level.  By contrast,  there  is a contin- 
uous  increase  in the  average  yield  of  temperate  cereals  in the  CIS.  This 
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Figure  16.  Average  yield  of 
temperate  cereals  Baseline  A.  The 
cropping  intensity  as  given  in  Table 
5  is  included  in  this  figure.  If  for 
example  the  average  yield  on  the 
harvested  area  is  2  tonnes  per 
hectare  and  the  cropping  intensity  is 
0.8, then  the  average  yield  presented 
in  this  figure  is  1.8  tonnes  per 
hectare. 
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yield  increase  is higher  than  the  assumed  technological  improvements  in 
yields,  indicating  that  parts  of  the  CIS  become  more  suitable  to  grow 
temperate  cereals.  The  increases  in  average  yields  by  a  factor  of  2.0  to 
3.5  in  China  plus  Centrally  Planned  Asia  and  Latin  America  are 
mainly  due  to  the  assumed  increase  in cropping  intensity  and  technolo- 
gical  improvements. 
Based  on  computed  food  demand  and  crop  yields,  and  assumed  food 
trade,  the  IMAGE  2  model  computes  future  agricultural  land.  This 
includes  both  pasture  and  cropland.  Under  Baseline  A the  total  amount 
of  agricultural  land  decreases  in  Europe  and  the  CIS  (Figures  17 and 
18). This  stems  from  the stabilization  of food  demand,  and  because  over- 
all  climate  becomes  more  favourable  for  crop  production  (except  in 
southern  Europe  and  the  southern  CIS).  Another  favourable  factor  is 
the  assumed  improvement  in crop  and  pasture  yields  arising  from  tech- 
nology.  This  shrinking  trend  occurs  in  all  industrialized  regions, 
although  the  location  of  agricultural  lands  within  these  regions  changes 
somewhat  because  of changed  climate  conditions. 
In  China,  as  well  as  in  other  parts  of  Asia  and  Africa,  enormously 
increasing  demands  for  food  in the  first  half  of  the  next  century  uses up 
virtually  all  suitable  land  for  crops  and  livestock.  Meanwhile  in  Latin 
America,  agricultural  land  expands  initially  because  of  increasing 
numbers  of  livestock,  and  levels  off  after  2030  mainly  because  the 
improvements  in  crop  and  pasture  yields  outweight  other  factors 
(Figures  17 and  18). 
On  the  global  level  the  amount  of  agricultural  land  sharply  increases 
up  to  2030 due  to  the  expansion  of  agricultural  land  in  the  developing 
regions  (Figure  19). Afterwards,  when  a  number  of  developing  regions 
have  used  up  all  their  suitable  land  for  crops  and  livestock,  the  global 
trend  is dominated  by  the  trend  in the  developed  regions  where  agricul- 
tural  lands  are  abandoned.  The  impact  of  abandonment  in  the  highest 
baseline  scenario  is even  stronger  than  in  Baseline  A.  In  this  scenario 
the faster  improvements  in animal  productivity  and crop  yields  in regions 
like  Latin  America  and  the  CIS  outweigh  the  increases  in demand.  The 
low  scenario  shows  a much  smaller  amount  of  agricultural  land,  mainly 
due  to  the  lower  human  population. 
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Agriculture  effected  by  climate  change 
As already  mentioned,  changes  in  temperature  and  precipitation  due  to 
climate  change  can  have  both  a  negative  and  positive  impact  on  crop 
yield.  Figure  20 presents  a global  overview  of  the  situation  in year  2100 
according  to  Baseline  A. Shown  is the  change  in their  potential  produc- 
tivity  due  to  climate  change  as  computed  by  the  FAO  crop  suitability 
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Flgure  17. Global  maps  of  land  cover  Baseline  A  (A)  Land  cover  1990,  (B)  Land  cover  2100. 
286 Baseline scenarios  of global  environmental  change:  J  Alcamo  et al 
models.  These  models  are embedded  in the IMAGE  2 model  as described 
by  Leemans  and  van  den  Born.26 The  two  types  of crops  that  are shown, 
temperate  cereals  and  maize,  have  different  responses  to  changes  in 
temperature,  precipitation  and  atmospheric  C02. 
For  the  Baseline  A  scenario,  yields  of  temperate  cereals  decrease  in 
21%  of  its  current  growing  area  because  of  climate  change  between 
‘6Leemans  and  van  den  Born,  op tit, Ref  7  1990 and  2100,  whereas  32%  of  the  area  of  maize  is  affected  (Figure 
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Figure  17. cont. (C) New  Land Cover  in 2100 relative  to 1990, (D) Old  Land Cover  from  1990 replaced  by 2100. 
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Fl9ure  19.  World  total  agricultural 
land  in three  baseline  scenarios.  1990  2000  2025  2050  2075  2100 
20).  For  the  low and  high  scenarios,  18 to  23%  of  the  area  of  temperate 
cereals  has decreasing  yields,  and  for  maize  22 to  34%  of the maize  area. 
Forests  and  other  land  cover 
One  of the most  important  consequences  of expanding  or  shrinking  agri- 
cultural  land  is the  changing  extent  of  forest  land.  This  has  great  signifi- 
cance  to  biodiversity,  to  human  cultures,  and  to  the  availability  of 
timber.  According  to  the  baseline  scenarios,  agricultural  land  expands 
largely  at  the  expense  of  forests,  especially  in  the  tropics  (as  it  does  in 
reality  now).  In  the  industrialized  regions,  where  agricultural  land 
shrinks  according  to  the  scenarios,  then  the  IMAGE  2 model  assumes 
that  it  will  be  replaced  by  naturally  occurring  vegetation.  This  means 
that  much  new forest  land  appears  in these  regions. 
To  examine  scenario  results,  we first concentrate  on the effect  of socio- 
economic  factors  simulated  by IMAGE  2, namely  the  expansion  of agri- 
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Figure  20. Change  in yield  of current  cropiand  1990-2100.  Baseline  A (A) Temperate  cereals  (B)  Maize. 
cultural  land  and  clearing  of  forests  for  fuelwood  (areas  managed  for 
lumber  are  assumed  to  be  reforested).  Under  Baseline  A,  these  factors 
alone  lead  to  a  shrinking  of  global  forests  from  around  4296  to  3170 
million  ha  between  1990 and  2100 {Figure  21). The  corresponding  rates 
of deforestation  are  17.0 million  ha/yr  in the first  half  of the next  century, 
and  0.2 million  ha/yr  in the  second  half  (Table  8). This  can  be compared 
to  the  estimated  rate  of  15.4  to  16.9 million  ha/yr  in  tropical  countries 
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Figure  21.  Status  of  forests  199&2100. 
Tabl.5.  mfuwkwol  -tOWf#Obd~ 
Nelforuluu  NOl_NlO  Nrosm-mle 
(db  h)  w-  wyr)  (Mll2on  ha&r) 
1990  2050  2100  1900-2050  2oe2100  1 e20-2050  2050-2100 
Baseline  A with climate change  4296  3435  3719  14.4  -5.7  19.3  0.7 
Baseline  A without climate change  4201  3179  3170  17.0  0.2  18.3  1.0 
27WRI.  World  Resources,  1992-1993,  World 
Resources  Institute.  Washington,  DC, 
1992;  FAO,  Forest  Resources  Assessment 
1990: Tropical  Countries,  FAO  Forestry 
Paper  No  112,  Food  and  Agricultural 
Organization  of  the  United  Nations, 
Rome,  1993 
in  the  1980s.27 Most  of  this  decline  is due  to  expansion  of  agricultural 
land  in  developing  regions  and  a  small  amount  to  fuelwood  demand. 
We  note  that  this  is the  net  decrease  in  forest  land,  because  some  new 
forest  land  (427 million  ha)  is added  from  abandoned  agricultural  lands 
in Europe  and  other  industrialized  regions. 
Adding  the  effect  of  climate  change  to  Baseline  A changes  the  picture 
considerably  (Table  8):  rather  than  a  continuous  decline,  global  forest 
area  stops  shrinking  around  2040,  and  then  slowly  rises  to  about  3719 
million  ha  in 2100. Hence,  climate  change  makes  a net  addition  to  forest 
area  because  of  its  net  global  influence  is to  lessen  the  area  needed  for 
agriculture  (See  Figure  19). Climate  change  also  adds  some  new  forest 
areas  where  climate  becomes  suitable  and  there  is enough  time  for  forests 
to  migrate.  However,  we already  noted  that  climate  change  will have  a 
negative  net effect  on  agriculture  in some  regions. 
An  indication  of  the  uncertainty  of  this  intermediate  estimate  is given 
by  the  lower  (Baseline  B) and  higher  (Baseline  C)  scenarios.  For  these 
scenarios,  the  net  deforestation  rates  range  from  6.7 to  10.6 million  ha/ 
yr  in  the  first  half  of  the  next  century,  and  increase  of  forests  by  5.3 to 
8.1 million  ha/yr  in the  second  half. 
The  first  columns  in Table  8 are  net forest  area,  and  they  are  useful  for 
assessing  total  world  timber  resources.  However,  a  better  indicator  of 
threat  to  biodiversity  and  forest  ecosystems  is the gross  rate  of deforesta- 
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tion,  ie the  amount  of  forest  land  converted  to  another  land  cover  type 
(Figure  21).  Under  climate  change,  more  forest  land  is converted  than 
without  climate  change.  Moreovei,  this  still underestimates  the  impacts 
of  climate  change  on  forests  because  it  does  not  indicate  the  area  that 
would  remain  forest  but  in  a  degraded  state.  Hence,  a  better  indicator 
of  the  risk  of  climate  change  to  forests  is the  extent  of  current  forest 
area  where  future  climate  will no longer  be suitable  for  the same  type  of 
forest  (that  is where  potential  vegetation  changes).  The  area  of  forests 
affected  by climate  change  in 2100 is one  third  of the current  forest  area 
(Figure  21). 
Impacts  on other land cover 
Climate  change  and  the  expansion  of  agriculture  affects  not  only  the 
condition  of forests,  but  also the condition  and  existence  of other  natural 
areas.  For  example,  savanna  areas  of  East  Africa  disappear  because  of 
the  expansion  of  agriculture,  and  much  of  the  tundra  area  in Northern 
Siberia  is  replaced  by  boreal  forest  as  a  result  of  climate  change 
(Figure  17 -  land  cover  maps  shown  earlier).  Under  Baseline  A,  34%  of 
the  earth’s  terrestrial  area  is converted  from  one  major  land  cover  type 
to another  between  1990 and  2100. 
Figure  22 presents  a global  overview  of the threat  to natural  vegetation. 
In the period  1990 to 2100 (Baseline  A) a total  of  16% of the earth’s  land 
area,  including  a  large  part  of  Africa  and  Asia,  is threatened  by  socio- 
economic  factors,  mainly  from  the demand  for  agricultural  land and  fuel- 
wood.  During  the  same  period,  41%  of  the  area  will  be  threatened  by 
climate  change,  meaning  that  the  potential  vegetation  in  this  area  will 
Climate  dwge 
Figure  22. Threat  to natural  vegetation  according  to  Baseline  A scenario  (1990-2100).  Socio-economic  here  refers  to 
current areas  of natural vegetation  that may be used for new agricultural  land or forest  products to satisfy future food 
and  fuel  demands  of  Baseline  A.  Climate  change  refers  to  areas  where  the  potential  vegetation  is  estimated  to 
change  because  of climate  change. 
291 Baseline scenarios  of global  environmental  change:  J  Alcamo  et al 
change as a result of climate change.  Note  that much  of the northern  tempe- 
rate zone,  and  large parts  of the rest of the world  will be affected. 
Emissions of air pollutants 
Regional  emissions  of  greenhouse  and  other  important  pollutant  gases 
are  the  sum  of  emissions  arising  from  all economic  sectors  and  sources 
in the  region  (Appendix  1). Figure  23 shows  that  emissions  of  CO*, the 
main  greenhouse  gas,  stabilizes  by  2030  in  OECD  Europe,  CIS,  and 
Latin  America.  This  has  to  do  with  either  the  stabilizing  of  energy 
consumption  or  the  increased  use of  lower  carbon  fuels  in these  regions. 
By comparison,  emissions  in the  region  of China  plus  Centrally  Planned 
Asia steadily  increase  along  with  the  growth  of  its economy. 
In Figure  24 we examine  the global  emissions  of key  gases divided  into 
four  large  categories:  energy,  industry,  land  use  and  natural.  Land  use 
(deforestation  and  decomposition  of organic  matter)  is an important  cate- 
gory  of  COZ emissions  up  to  the  middle  of  the  twenty-first  century  but 
‘then  the declining  rate  of deforestation  leads to a decline  in its importance. 
The  deforestation  rate  declines  for  different  reasons  in different  regions  -- 
in industrialized  regions  because  the expansion  of agricultural  land  slows, 
and  in developing  regions  because  the  remaining  forest  area  is depleted. 
The  rapid  but  temporary  decrease  in land use emissions  of COZ after  2025 
comes  from  the  rapid  decline  of  deforestation  in  Africa  as  most  of  the 
region’s forest  areas  are depleted  for agriculture.  Land  use remains  a signif- 
icant  source  of  CO2 in OECD  Europe  and  CIS  after  2040 because  of  the 
decomposition  of wood  products  produced  earlier  in the scenario  period. 
Land  related  sources  make  up  the  main  part  of  two  important  green- 
house  gases,  methane  (CHJ  and  nitrous  oxide  (N20)  emissions.  This  is 
because  an  important  source  of  these  gases  is  agricultural  activity, 
which  grows  in importance  throughout  the  scenario  period.  By contrast, 
land  related  sources  make  up a smaller  and  smaller  part  of the total  emis- 
sions  of carbon  monoxide  (CO)  and  volatile  organic  compounds  (VOC), 
two  gases which  play  an  important  role  in the  formation  of ozone  in the 
troposphere.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  an  important  source  of  these 
CO2  emissions 
Figure  2s.  Time  trends  of  COP 
emissions  for  four  regions  in  0.0  I  I  I  I 
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Figure  24. Global  emissions  of greenhouse  gases  and ozone  precursors  Baseline  A. 
gases  is  deforestation,  which  as  mentioned  above,  diminishes  over  the 
scenario  period. 
Energy  related  sources  make  up  by  far  the  largest  part  of global  CO*, 
NO,,  CO  and  VOC  emissions.  The  use  of  fossil  fuels  in  the  transport 
sector  explains  much  of  the  increase  in NO,,  CO and  VOC,  while indus- 
try  is of  primary  importance  to  COz.  Natural  sources  (such  as emissions 
by  ocean  biota  and  lightning)  are  an  important  component  of  global 
NZO, NO,,  and  CO emissions. 
Figure  25 compares  different  baseline  estimates  of  global  CO2 emis- 
sions,  the most  important  important  greenhouse  gas (Appendix  1). Emis- 
sions in Baseline  A, the intermediate  scenario,  reach  22.0 Gt C/yr  in 2100, 
while  Baselines  B  and  C  span  from  8.5  to  27.8 Gt/yr.  Results  for 
Baseline  A in 2100 are  close  to  the  intermediate  IPCC  emission  scenario 
(IS92a),  but  Baselines  B and  C are much  less extreme  than  the  minimum 
and  maximum  IPCC  scenarios  (IS92c  and  e). This  is interesting  because 
Baselines  B and  C have  the  same  economic  and  population  assumptions 
as the  extreme  IPCC  scenarios.  The  difference  is caused  by  the  different 
models  and  input  assumptions  used  to  make  these  estimates.  Although 
economic  growth  is substantially  higher  in Baseline  C  than  B, opposing 
trends  reduce  the  differences  between  the  scenarios.  On  one  hand,  the 
higher  economic  level  leads  to  more  economic  activity  which  will 
obviously  tend  to  increase  emissions.  On  the  other  hand,  higher 
economic  growth  will lead  to  a variety  of economic  effects  that  will tend 
to  lower  emissions.  For  example,  a  higher  rate  of  structural  change  is 
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Figure  21.  Global  emissions  of  COP  00 
for  three  baseline  scenarios.  1990  2000  2025  2050  2075  2100 
assumed,  and  therefore  a  faster  shift  will  occur  from  energy  intensive 
heavy  industry  to  lighter  industry.  In  addition,  appliances  and  power 
plants  with  a  higher  rate  of  energy  efficiency  will  be  introduced  at  a 
faster  rate  into  the  economy.  The  net  effect  of  these  opposing  tendencies 
is that  the  differences  between  Baseline  A to  C in energy  use  and  emis- 
sions  (Figure  25) is smaller  than  the  differences  between  corresponding 
IPCC  scenarios  with  the  same  economic  and  population  assumptions. 
In  the  same  way,  the  Baseline  B  scenario  (the  lowest  of  the  three 
IMAGE  baseline  scenarios)  does  not  give  as  low  an  estimate  of  CO2 
emissions  as the  lowest  IPCC  scenario  (IS92c). 
Atmosphere, ocean and climate 
Change  in  atmosphere  and  climate 
Changes  in  emissions  and  fluxes  of  gases  lead  to  changes  in  atmo- 
spheric  concentrations  of  various  gases.  Under  Baseline  A, CO2 reaches 
an  atmospheric  concentration  of  737ppm,  more  than  twice  current 
levels.  Baselines  B  and  C  range  from  528  to  886ppm  (Figure  26).  In 
Baseline  B,  although  emissions  stabilize  (Figure  25)  concentrations 
continue  to  increase  because  of  the  long  response  time  of  the  climate 
system. 
The  increase  in  global  average  surface  temperature  between  1990 
and  2100  resulting  from  the  buildup  of  CO*  and  other  greenhouse 
gases  is  2.8”C  (Figure  27),  ranging  from  approximately  4.O”C in  the 
higher  latitudes  to  25°C  in  the  Tropics.  The  global  average  increase 
for  the  low  and  high  scenarios  are  1.6  and  3.4”C,  respectively.  The 
lower  economic  growth  of  the  low  scenario  results  in  a  slowing  of  the 
growth  in  global  temperature  by  the  second  half  of  the  next  century. 
For  the  two  higher  baseline  scenarios  (A  and  C)  the  rate  of  tempera- 
ture  increase  is more  rapid  in  the  coming  decades  than  between  1970 
and  1990 or  in  the  second  half  of  the  next  century.  This  is because  of 
the  rapid  buildup  in emissions  before  that  time,  and  because  the  driv- 
ing  forces  of  climate  change  slow  down  in  the  second  half  of  the  next 
century. 
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Figure  26.  Average  atmospheric 
level  of  CO2 for  Baselines  B  and  C, 
and  Baseline  A  with  and  without 
climate  change  included. 
Figure  27.  Increase  in  global 
average  surface  temperature 







300 1  I  I  I  I  I 





1990  2000  2025  2050  2075  2100 
Sea  level  rise 
Increased  ocean  temperatures,  together  with  the  melting  of  glaciers  and 
ice  caps  lead  to  an  increase  in  the  mean  sea  level  during  the  scenario 
period.  According  to  Baseline  A,  sea  level  will  rise  by  43cm  between 
1990 and  2100 (Figure  28). The  lower  and  higher  scenarios  have  a range 
of  32 to 49 cm increase  for  the  same  period  (Figure  28). 
The  temporal  pattern  of  sea  level  rise  is  different  from  many  other 
indicators  in  this  paper.  For  example,  it  has  already  been  mentioned 
that  the  rate  of  deforestation  and  global  temperature  change  slows 
down  in the  second  half  of  the  next  century.  This  is because  the  driving 
forces  of  climate  change  grow  more  slowly  in this  period.  In contrast  to 
this  trend,  sea level  rise accelerates  in the  second  half  of  the  twenty-first 
century  because  of  the  slow  response  time  of  the. ocean  to  large-scale 
changes  in global  climate. 
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Figure  28.  Mean  sea  level  rise 
relative  to  1990  for  three  baseline 
scenarios.  1990  2000  2025  2050  2075  2100 
Feedbacks  between  atmosphere,  climate  and the terrestrial  environment 
Because’ IMAGE  2 is an  integrated  model,  it  can  simulate  many  of  the 
couplings  that  occur  between  the  atmosphere,  climate  and  terrestrial 
environment.  These  couplings  lead  to  important  feedback  processes, 
especially  between  the  atmosphere  and  terrestrial  environment.  In  the 
following  paragraphs  we explain  the  important  impact  of these  feedback 
processes  on  scenario  calculations. 
Impact  on emissions.  Emissions  of  nitrous  oxide  (NzO)  arise  partly  from 
volatilization  of  organic  fertilizers  applied  to  agricultural  fields  and 
other  soil  processes.  Since  these  soil-related  emissions  change  with 
temperature  and  precipitation,28  their  long-term  trend  depends  on  the 
rate  of climate  change.  Under  Baseline  A,  land  use  related  emissions  of 
N20  reach  11.4Tg/yr  in  2100 without  climate  feedback,  and  15.0Tg/yr 
with  feedbacks  included.  Hence  climate  feedbacks  have  a  considerable 
effect  on emissions. 
Impact  on concentration.  Increased  surface  temperatures  tend  to  dampen 
the  buildup  of  CO2  in  the  atmosphere  because  of  the  following  feed- 
backs: 
l  COZ  fertilization  -  increased  atmospheric  CO2  increases  plant 
productivity  which  in  turn  increases  plant  uptake  of  atmospheric 
CO2 and  dampens  the  buildup  of atmospheric  COz. 
l  Soil respiration  -  changes  in average  temperature  and  soil moisture 
tend  to  change  the  decomposition  rate  of  organic  matter  in  soil, 
and  thus  the  amount  of  CO2  released  by  soil  to  the  atmosphere. 
This  can  enhance  or dampen  the  release  of CO2 from  the  biosphere 
to  the  atmosphere. 
l  Plant  productivity  -  temperature  change  affects  plant  productivity, 
and  hence  the  rate  at  which  plants  take  up  CO2  from  the  atmo- 
sphere. 
“Kreileman  and  Bouwman,  op tit, Ref 6 
The  net  effect  of  these  feedbacks  on  the  atmospheric  concentration  of 
COT is presented  in Figure  26. Under  Baseline  A, atmospheric  concentra- Baseline scenarios of global environmental  change: J  Alcamo et al 
tions  reach  937 ppm  without  feedbacks  and  737 ppm  if they  are  included. 
Hence  the  feedbacks  have  a  substantial  impact  on  the  computed  atmo- 
spheric  concentration  of  C02. 
29Alcamo.  op  tit,  Fief 2 
Impact  on  agricultural  land.  Changes  in  temperature  and  precipitation 
may  either  enhance  or  reduce  potential  crop  productivity  and  therefore 
affect  the  amount  of  agricultural  land  required  to  satisfy  food  demand. 
The  net  effect  of  this  climate  feedback  is quite  different  from  region  to 
region.  For  Latin  America,  climate  change  tends  to  lower  the  demand 
for  agricultural  land  because  climate  change  has  a net  positive  effect  on 
potential  crop  productivity  in  the  region’s  temperate  zone  (Figure  20). 
Climate  change  has  the  opposite  effect  on  China  and  Centrally  Planned 
Asia,  where  more  agricultural  land  is  required  because  of  climate 
change.  For  the world  as a whole,  these  regional  trends  tend  to compen- 
sate,  and  as  a  result  somewhat  less  agricultural  land  is  needed  with 
climate  change  than  without. 
Discussion and main findings 
Scenario  estimates  have  many  sources  of  uncertainty.  The  uncertainty  of 
scenario  calculations  stems  from  many  sources,  especially  the uncertainty 
of driving  forces,  and  the  uncertainty  of the  structure  and  parameters  of 
the  IMAGE  2  model  used  for  scenario  calculations.  The  testing  and 
uncertainty  of  the  various  submodels  of  IMAGE  2 is discussed  in detail 
elsewhere.29  Here  we  concentrate  on  the  effect  of  uncertain  driving 
forces,  ie  the  assumptions  about  population,  income,  activity  in 
economic  sectors,  and  all  other  factors  that  must  be  specified  for  each 
scenario.  Since each  of the  baseline  scenarios  uses a different  set of driv- 
ing forces,  the  range  of  baseline  results  is a rough  indicator  of  the  effect 
of  uncertain  driving  forces  on  model  calculations.  Figure  29 shows  that 
baseline  calculations  of different  global  change  indicators  vary  by  about 
fl&60%,  depending  on  the  variable.  The  variation  below  the  median 
value  is much  larger  than  above  it,  indicating  that  the  medium  baseline 
(Baseline  A) may  be biased  towards  the  high  side of  the  mean.  It  should 
be  emphasized  that  these  variations  are  only  caused  by  the  selected 
range  of  scenario  driving  forces,  and  not  because  of  internal  model 
uncertainty.  Moreover,  these  estimates  do  not  reflect  the  errors  that 
accumulate  in  the  scenarios  as energy  calculations  are  used  to  estimate 
emissions,  and  emissions  used  to  estimate  climate  change,  and  so  on. 
These  cumulative  errors  have  not  yet  been  investigated. 
Many  results  of  the  three  baseline  scenarios  tend  to converge.  Although 
the  three  scenarios  use  quite  different  assumptions  for  main  driving 
forces  of global  change,  their  results  tend  to converge.  Note,  for  example, 
the  small  variation  in  baseline  estimates  of  total  forest  area  shown  in 
Figure  29. Indeed,  in some  cases  their  temporal  trends  actually  overlap, 
as in the number  of livestock.  They  tend  to converge  because  of compen- 
sating  factors.  For  example,  the higher  economic  growth  in Baseline  C as 
compared  to  A  tends  to  both  increase  energy  consumption  because 
economic  activity  grows  faster,  and  decrease  energy  consumption 
because  the  efficiency  of energy  use improves  at a faster  pace. 
The  main  difference  between  the  baselines  is that  in  Baseline  B  (the 
scenario  with  the  lowest  economic  growth  and  population)  many  global 
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Variation  of baseline estimates  (Year 2100) 
Amount  of forest  area 
Total  CO2 emissions 
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Figure  29. Range  of baseline  estimates  in the year  2100 for various  indicators  (global  averages).  The  median  of these 
estimates  are  all  Baseline  A except  for forest  area  which  has a median  value  from  Baseline  B. 
change  indicators  tend  to  stabi!ize  by  the  middle  of  next  century,  but  in 
the  other  two  scenarios  they  continue  to grow.  This  applies  to  secondary 
and  primary  energy  consumption,  emissions  of  many  gases,  growth  in 
agricultural  land,  and  increase  in global  temperature. 
There  are  contrasting  regional  trends  in  energy  consumption.  In  the  base- 
line  scenarios,  the  combination  of  many  different  factors  (eg  structural 
changes  in  regional  economies,  technological  improvements  in  energy 
conversion,  fuel  price  increases)  has  the  net  effect  of  substantially 
decreasing  energy  intensity  of  regional  economies.  In  industrialized 
regions  the  trend  in  energy  intensity  together  with  the  leveling  off  of 
population  leads  to  a  stabilization  of  overall  energy  use  in  the  coming 
decades.  By  comparison,  the  growth  of  population  in  developing 
regions  outweighs  steady  improvements  in  energy  efficiency,  with  the 
result  that  energy  consumption  steadily  grows  in  the  next  century,  and 
only  slows  down  in  the  second  half  of  the  century.  In  the  baseline 
scenarios,  this  increase  in  energy  consumption  is  accompanied  by  a 
large  increase  in the  emissions  of  greenhouse  gases and  other  pollutants 
(Appendix  1). 
Agricultural  land  goes  through  important  expansion  or  contraction  in 
different  parts  of  the  world.  Under  the  baseline  scenarios,  agriculture 
continues  to  intensify  in  developing  regions  (eg  cereal  yields  increase 
by  a factor  of 2 to  4 by  the  middle  of  next  century),  but  this  intensitica- 
tion  cannot  keep  up  with  increasing  demand  for  food  and  fuelwood. 
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Hence  the  amount  of  agricultural  land  grows  rapidly  in  developing 
regions,  and  only  begins  to  stabilize  at  the  end  of  next  century.  In 
some  developing  regions  land  may  be  inadequate  to  satisfy  the 
demands  for  livestock.  In  industrial  regions,  the  growth  in  crop  yield 
and  stabilization  of  food  demand  lead  to  continued  abandonment  of 
agricultural  land. 
Climate  change  will affect  crop  productivity  both  positively  and  nega- 
tively  depending  on  location,  and  its  net  effect  will  be  to  increase  the 
demand  for  land  in some  regions  and  decrease  it in others. 
Large  changes-occur  in the extent  of forests  and  other  natural  areas.  The 
expansion  of agriculture  together  with climate  change  will lead  to  signifi- 
cant  changes  in  forest  and  other  non-agricultural  land  cover.  For  the 
intermediate  scenario,  we  estimate  that  34%  of  the  earth’s  land  cover 
will  convert  from  one  major  type  to  another  between  1990 and  2100. 
This  will have  profound  implications  on  the  viability  of  natural  ecosys- 
tems  and  the  prospects  of maintaining  current  biological  diversity. 
Under  the  baseline  scenarios,  climate  change  enlarges  the  size  of 
forests  (less agricultural  land  needed  and  replaced  partly  by  forests).  At 
the  same  time  it  also  increases  forest  area  under  risk  because  local 
climate  becomes  unfavourable  for  the current  forest  types. 
Feedbacks  are  important  in  the  global  system.  Important  feedback 
processes  occur  in the  global  system  because  of  interactions  between  the 
atmsophere,  climate  and  terrestrial  environment.  These  feedback 
processes  can  have  an important  impact  on scenario  calculations  of emis- 
sions,  atmospheric  levels  of  gases,  extent  of  agricultural  land,  and  other 
indicators  of  global  environmental  change.  For  that  reason  they  should 
be taken  into  account  in baseline  studies. 
The  pace  of  global  environmental  change  may  be  higher  in  the  coming 
decades  than before  or after.  Under  the  baseline  scenarios  many  impor- 
tant  indicators  of  the  global  environment  will  change  more  rapidly  in 
the  coming  decades  than  in  the  period  before  or  after  (Figure  30). 
For  example,  under  Baseline  A,  global  surface  temperature  increases 
by  0.30  per  decade  up  to  2030  and  0.25  per  decade  afterwards.  Also, 
between  1990 and  2030,  the  number  of  livestock  in the  world  increases 
by  a  factor  of  2,  the  amount  of  agricultural  land  by  a  33%,  and  the 
deforestation  rate  is  comparable  with  current  rates.  The  pace  of 
change  will  be  much  faster  in  developing  countries  than  in  industria- 
lized  countries,  but  the  loss  of  forests  and  natural  areas  are  of  global 
concern.  The  pace  of  change  is  even  faster  in  the  high  baseline 
scenario,  although  it  is  somewhat  slower  for  most  indicators  in  the 
low  scenario.  This  rapid  change  arises  mainly  from  scenario  assump- 
tions  about  population  and  economic  growth.  But  it  should  be  noted 
that  these  assumptions  are  consistent  with  conventional  projections  of 
population  and  income. 
Closing  remarks 
The  baseline  scenarios  in  this  paper  are  an  effort  to  fill in  some  of  the 
gaps  in  the  complex  picture  of  future  global  environmental  changes. 
They  show  some  of  the  couplings  between  components  of  the  global Baseline scenarios  of global  environmental 
Figure  30.  Temporal  trends  of 
various  global  change  indicators  in 
Baseline  A.  Note  units  have  been 
change:  J  Alcamo  et al 
Fraction of Change  1990-2100 
*  Mean annual  temperature change 
normalized.  2000  2025  2050  2075  2100 
system,  and  the  implications  these  couplings  could  have  on  the  global 
society  and  environment.  They  also  give  insight  into  trends  that  may 
continue  or newly  emerge  in the  absence  of international  policy  interven- 
tion.  In  so  doing,  these  baseline  scenarios  also  point  out  where  policy 
intervention  may  be especially  important: 
l  To  avoid  high  energy  use  and  emissions  in  particular  from  the 
future  industry  and  transport  sectors  in  both  industrialized  and 
developing  regions. 
0  To  protect  natural  vegetation  in the  northern  and  southern  tempe- 
rate  zones  from  climate  changes. 
l  To  protect  natural  vegetation  in the  tropics  and  developing  coun- 
tries  from  expanding  agriculture. 
l  To  slow  down  the  especially  rapid  pace  of  global  environmental 
change  that  may  occur  in the  coming  decades. 
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Appendix 
Overview  of  the  global  emissions  for  several  air- 
pollutants  and  greenhouse  gases  for  the  different 
baseline  scenarios 
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10.3  10  9 
3.4  3.6 
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-2  (PQ  CfYr) 
202s  2050  2100 
22  7  22.3  21.9 
49.8  44.1  40.1 
69.7  67.9  60.4 
109.0  116.7  173.3 
32.1  30.2  27.6 
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83.7  102.9  124.8 
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4.3  42  3.8 
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0.2  0.2 
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0.5  0.7 
0.3  1.3 
1.1  1.5 
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1.0  1.2 
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15.4  15.6  22.0  107  13.0  15.0  16.2  18.5 
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4.7  8.5  16.0 
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11.9  14.6  17.5 
3.4  4.9  7.4 
0.5  0.5  0.6 
1.1  1.2  1.6 
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1.4  1.6  1.6  1.5  1.4 
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8.1  9.3  9.6  8.4  8.3 
1.6  1.8  2.0  2.1  2.4 
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4.2  7.4  9.0  9.9  11.3 
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co m  CfYrl 
1990  2010 
2.9  3.0 
26.2  27.4 
80.8  99.4 
98.9  177  2 
37.2  23.1 
10.4  11.4 
30.4  37.1 
18.7  36.6 
45.5  57.2 
73.3  78.9 
25.2  43  7 
5.9  4.6 
3.4  4.0 
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NzO  (Te  N/Y0 
2025  2050  2100 
3.0  3.0  3.6 
56.9  26.2  33.7 
102.5  79.8  95.3 
246.3  68  1  128.2 
24  4  22  1  27.4 
13.6  13  5  18.7 
55.8  59.5  77.6 
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71.8  80.5  104.4 
108.9  132.4  152.5 
52.6  55.4  79.8 
5.3  5.6  6.8 
4.0  4.7  6.1 
797.9  646.0  908.9 
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a.4  a.5 
3.4  4.9 
6.9  a.2 
11.6  11.2 
4.2  6.5 
1.3  1.3 
3.8  5.2 
91.1  102.3 
2021  2050  2100 
co  ml  c/Ye 
1990  2010  2025  2050  2100 
22.1  21.4  20.3 
43.8  36.6  27.4 
66.5  62.4  57.6 
80.4  92.7  107.2 
30.2  26.0  la.5 
15.6  12.6  7.4 
84.8  75.0  61.6 
29.2  33.2  31.9 
70.2  76.3  65.6 
71.5  75.9  67.8 
37.3  39.4  32.1 
9.8  a.2  7.3 
4.0  3.3  2.6 
565.3  562.9  507.3 
2.9  2.7 
26.2  25.0 
80.8  86.8 
98.9  123.5 
37.2  22.0 
10.4  10.5 





73.3  68.4 
25.2  38.4 
5.9  4.3 
3.4  3.7 
458.7  498.3 
N.0  Vg  N/y0 
2.6  2.3  1.9 
44.2  20.0  la.7 
110.4  69.8  90.2 
164.2  111.4  87.0 
20.9  16.7  13.4 
11.0  a.4  4.6 
41.5  38.0  35.5 
35.5  50.6  64.9 
56.6  65.3  75.2 
86.0  89.4  73.2 
46.1  42.0  43.4 
5.0  5.3  10.6 
4.0  3.0  2.5 
627.9  522.1  521.0 
0.2  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
1.8  1.3  1  .o  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.7 
0.9  0.6  0.8  2.8  3.0  3.3  3.3  3.4 
1.3  1.0  1.0  2.3  2.5  2.9  3.1  3.4 
1.2  1.0  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.4 
0.5  0.4  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1 
1.2  0.9  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.8 
0.4  0.6  0.7  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.5  0.5 
0.6  0.9  1.1  0.8  1.1  1.3  1.4  1.2 
1.7  I.8  1.5  1.1  1.4  1.6  i .a  1.7 
0.5  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.9  1.0  1.0  0.9 
0.1  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.3 
0.4  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
10.9  9.5  a.5  10.7  12.2  13.7  14.2  13.6 
0.4  0.3  0.2 
5.2  4.1  2.9 
3.4  3.6  5.1 
3.7  4.0  6.3 
1.7  1.4  0.9 
2.7  1.9  0.8 
5.6  4.6  3.3 
3.0  4.3  5.6 
3.7  5.6  6.7 
a.4  a.4  6.4 
2.9  3.2  3.4 
0.5  0.4  0.3 
0.9  0.8  0.6 
42.2  42.7  42.7 
1.4  1.1  0.8 
16.1  11.1  a.3 
16.3  11.5  13.9 
22.7  16.6  13.8 
a.3  6.6  4.0 
1.8  1.5  1.0 
9.7  a.5  6.0 
5.8  7.0  a.4 
9.7  ii.8  13.2 
12.8  13.6  13.6 
7.8  7.2  6.5 
1.4  1.2  1.7 
5.6  4.9  3.5 
119.4  102.7  92.5 
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TNbla  M.  QNsdlNo  c 
Canada 
USA 





Middle  East 
India  + S Asia 












Middle  East 
India  +  S Asia 





Canada  1.4  1.6  1.6  1.5  1.6 
USA  14.7  18.5  18.8  16.0  17.6 
Latin  America  12.0  11.3  13.5  17.0  16.1 
Africa  13.9  25.0  29.6  17.6  29.7 
OECD  Europe  8.1  9.7  9.8  8.7  11.7 
EEU  1.6  2.0  2.3  2.7  4.4 
CIS  8.4  11.8  14.1  14.0  13.0 
Middle  East  3.4  6.7  9.3  14.7  19.6 
India  +  S Asia  6.9  10.7  14.7  21.7  23.3 
China  + C P Asia  11.6  14.9  20.0  28.1  42.7 
East Asia  4.2  7.5  8.9  10.6  137 
Oceania  1.3  1.5  1.6  1.6  1.8 
Japan  3.8  6.6  8.2  10.5  14.3 
World  91.1  125.8  152.4  164.8  2094 
CM4 cl0 CWvr) 
1990  2010 
22.2  22.7 
38.3  45.3 
50.9  60.1 
46.3  76.8 
28.4  31.1 
10.6  18.0 
83.9  99.4 
16.3  32.5 
50.8  68.1 
50.6  74.1 
24.3  34.0 
10.3  10.9 
3.4  3.7 
436.2  576.5 
C%(PQC~yr) 
02  0.2 
1.5  2.4 
0.5  0.5 
0.3  1.5 
1.1  1.6 
0.3  0.7 
1.0  1.6 
0.2  0.5 
0.2  0.8 
1.0  2.1 
0.3  0.6 
0.1  0.2 
0.3  06 
7.1  13.1 
No.VsNb) 
0.5  0.5 
5.6  6.7 
2.1  2.8 
19  3.9 
2.3  2.0 
19  3.5 
43  7.4 
16  3.4 
16  4.3 
3.9  10.1 
1.1  3.1 
0.5  0.5 
1.4  1.2 
28.8  49.4 
Voc(TgVoclyr) 
2025  2050  2100 
22.5  22.1  22.0 
49.1  44.1  40.4 
67.0  66.2  63.8 
115.3  147.2  198.1 
32.0  30.4  28.3 
21.9  21.6  25.2 
105.3  102.6  95.7 
43.5  60.6  85.7 
85.9  113.1  131.6 
95.3  121.6  161.1 
39.9  49.6  53.0 
10.1  9.5  9.3 
4.6  4.6  4.3 
692.3  793.2  9185 
0.2  0.2  0.3 
2.5  2.1  2.1 
0.8  1.1  1.3 
2.4  2.2  3.6 
1.6  1.3  1.4 
0.9  0.9  1.0 
2.0  2.1  2.2 
0.7  1.2  2.2 
1.5  3.1  4.6 
3.2  4.5  6.1 
0.9  13  1.9 
0.2  0.1  01 
0.6  0.6  09 
17.5  20.7  278 
0.5  0.4  05 
7.0  6.0  5.2 
4.3  6.2  6.5 
7.4  11.9  20.1 
2.2  1.9  1.8 
4.4  4.3  4.0 
9.8  10.2  10.2 
5.2  9.4  16.3 
8.2  178  25.4 
15.3  19.4  24.5 
4.2  5.9  8.1 
0.5  0.5  0.6 
1.2  1.4  2.1 
70.1  95.3  125.2 
co  CTg  C&r) 
1990  2010 
2.9  3.0 
26.2  27.4 
80.8  69.0 
98.9  180.9 
37.2  23.4 
10.4  12.7 
30.4  49.4 
18.7  39.8 
45.5  63.2 
73.3  88.8 
25.2  43.4 
59  5.1 
3.4  4.3 
458.7  610.4 
&xO(TON~) 
0.2  0.2 
0.8  1.0 
2.8  3.0 
2.3  2.9 
0.5  0.7 
0.2  0.2 
0.7  0.8 
0.2  0.3 
0.8  1.3 
11  1.5 
07  0.9 
03  0.4 
0.1  0.1 
10.7  13.1 
2025  POSO  2100 
3.0  3.0  3.7 
48.2  26.0  33.4 
76.4  91.4  94.4 
203.5  82.5  151.1 
24.6  20.6  26.0 
15.3  16.8  31.2 
63.8  65.5  77.6 
57.2  103.9  177.1 
75.4  94.4  116.7 
132.1  162.4  202.8 
49.8  59.3  84.5 
5.6  6.1  8.0 
4.9  5.2  7.5 
757.9  737.2  1013.9 
0.2  0.2  0.3 
1.0  1.1  1.2 
3.2  3.5  4.0 
3.5  3.6  4.4 
0.7  07  0.8 
0.2  0.2  0.2 
0.9  1.0  1.3 
0.4  07  1.1 
1.5  1.9  1.8 
1.8  2.3  2.5 
1.0  1.1  1.3 
0.4  0.4  0.5 
0.1  0.1  0.2 
15.0  16.8  19.7 
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